Four Candidates Hypothetical
Hypothetical run by Copilot using Elected Together Methodology
1. Scenario interpretation framework
Candidate table
| Candidate | Affiliation |
| Blue 1 | Progressive |
| Red 1 | Conservative |
| Green 1 | Independent/Centrist |
| Gold 1 | Libertarian |
Voter group table
Design aims:
- Strong Blue–Red separation (minimal direct crossover).
- Green and Gold act as bridge/secondary preferences.
- No first-round majority.
| Group | Size | 1st choice | 2nd choice | 3rd choice | 4th choice |
| G1 | 22 | Blue 1 | Green 1 | Gold 1 | Red 1 |
| G2 | 10 | Blue 1 | Green 1 | ||
| G3 | 8 | Blue 1 | |||
| G4 | 21 | Red 1 | Gold 1 | Green 1 | Blue 1 |
| G5 | 9 | Red 1 | Gold 1 | ||
| G6 | 5 | Red 1 | |||
| G7 | 13 | Green 1 | Blue 1 | Gold 1 | Red 1 |
| G8 | 5 | Green 1 | Red 1 | Blue 1 | Gold 1 |
| G9 | 7 | Gold 1 | Red 1 | Green 1 | Blue 1 |
- Total electorate: 100 voters
2. Majority seat RCV process
First-choice tally
| Candidate | Votes | From groups |
| Blue 1 | 40 | G1, G2, G3 |
| Red 1 | 35 | G4, G5, G6 |
| Green 1 | 18 | G7, G8 |
| Gold 1 | 7 | G9 |
- No candidate > 50% → proceed to runoff.
Round 1: eliminate Gold 1 (7)
- Transfer: G9 (7) → Red 1 (next viable: Red 1)
Tally after transfer:
| Candidate | Votes | Exhausted |
| Blue 1 | 40 | 0 |
| Red 1 | 42 | 0 |
| Green 1 | 18 | 0 |
Round 2: eliminate Green 1 (18)
- Transfer: G7 (13) → Blue 1 (next viable: Blue 1)
- Transfer: G8 (5) → Red 1 (next viable: Red 1)
Tally after transfer:
| Candidate | Votes | Exhausted |
| Blue 1 | 53 | 0 |
| Red 1 | 47 | 0 |
- Majority winner: Blue 1 (53%)
Majority seat power allocation
- Ballots used to elect Blue 1: G1 (22), G2 (10), G3 (8), plus transfers from G7 (13).
- Second-choice additions for Blue 1 not already used: None (no remaining group lists Blue 1 as second without already contributing to the majority tally).
Power computation: [ 2.0 \text{ seats} \times 0.53 = 1.06 \text{ seats} ]
- Majority seat: Blue 1 with 1.06 seats of voting power.
- Removed from minority pool (for being used in majority power): G1 (22), G2 (10), G3 (8), G7 (13).
- Second-choice removals: None (no qualifying ballots).
3. Minority seat RCV process
Minority pool composition
| Group | Size | 1st choice | 2nd choice | 3rd choice | 4th choice |
| G4 | 21 | Red 1 | Gold 1 | Green 1 | Blue 1 |
| G5 | 9 | Red 1 | Gold 1 | ||
| G6 | 5 | Red 1 | |||
| G8 | 5 | Green 1 | Red 1 | Blue 1 | Gold 1 |
| G9 | 7 | Gold 1 | Red 1 | Green 1 | Blue 1 |
- Total ballots in minority pool: 47
First-choice tally (minority pool)
| Candidate | Votes | From groups |
| Red 1 | 35 | G4, G5, G6 |
| Gold 1 | 7 | G9 |
| Green 1 | 5 | G8 |
| Blue 1 | 0 | — |
- No candidate > 50% of 47 → proceed.
Round 1 (minority): eliminate Green 1 (5)
- Transfer: G8 (5) → Red 1 (next viable: Red 1)
Tally after transfer:
| Candidate | Votes | Exhausted |
| Red 1 | 40 | 0 |
| Gold 1 | 7 | 0 |
- Minority winner: Red 1 (40 of 47)
Minority seat power allocation
Remaining power: [ 2.0 – 1.06 = 0.94 \text{ seats} ]
- Minority seat: Red 1 with 0.94 seats of voting power.
4. Final seat outcomes
| Seat type | Candidate | Affiliation | Voting power |
| Majority seat | Blue 1 | Progressive | 1.06 |
| Minority seat | Red 1 | Conservative | 0.94 |
5. Narrative and explanation
- Coalition structure: Blue and Red maintain polarized first-choice blocs with minimal direct crossover. Green and Gold function as bridge preferences—Green leaning Blue, Gold leaning Red—shaping transfers without collapsing ideological distinction.
- Runoff dynamics: Gold 1’s early elimination consolidates Red. Green 1’s elimination then splits decisively toward Blue (G7 → Blue) and Red (G8 → Red), pushing Blue over the majority threshold.
- Power attribution: Because few ballots outside Blue’s base listed Blue as a second choice, Blue’s office power closely tracks the actual win margin (1.06). The second-choice addition rule had no incremental effect here, signaling authentic minority space.
- Minority representation: With Blue-used ballots removed, Red dominates the minority pool and secures 0.94 seats—substantial counterweight to the majority. This yields two distinct voices with near-parity influence across the term, subject to annual stewardship shifts.
- Edge-case note: No tie occurred, so dual elimination and “original first-choice tiebreak” rules were not invoked. No ballots exhausted; if exhaustion had occurred, they would have been equally divided among remaining candidates per ET rules.